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Résumé: Nous rendons compte d’une série d’expériences de laboratoire à propos des comportements 
de vote. Dans une situation où les sujets ont des préférences unimodales nous observons que 
le vote à un tour et le vote à deux tours génèrent des effets significatifs de dépendance du 
chemin, alors que le vote par approbation élit toujours le vainqueur de Condorcet et que le 
vote unique transférable (système de Hare) ne l’élit jamais. A partir de l’analyse des données 
individuelles nous concluons que les électeurs se comportent de manière stratégique tant que 
les calculs stratégiques ne sont pas trop complexes, auquel cas ils se repose sur des 
heuristiques simples. 
 
Abstract: We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single peaked 
preferences we find that One-round voting and Two-round voting generate significant path 
dependent effects, whereas Approval voting elects the Condorcet winner and Single 
Transferable vote (Hare system) does not. From the analysis of individual data we conclude 
that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too involved, in which 
case they rely on simple heuristics. 
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1 Introduction
One of the most celebrated pieces of work in the field of electoral systems is
due to Maurice Duverger whose comparison of electoral systems in the 1950s
showed that proportional representation creates conditions favourable to foster
multi-party development, while the plurality system tends to favour a two-party
system (Duverger, 1951). To explain these diﬀerences, he drew a distinction be-
tween mechanical and psychological eﬀects. The mechanical eﬀect corresponds
to the transformation of votes into seats. The psychological eﬀect can be viewed
as the anticipation of the mechanical system: voters are aware that there is a
threshold of representation (Lijphart 1994), and they decide not to support
parties that are likely to be excluded because of the mechanical eﬀect.
Since then, strategic voting has been considered as the central explanation of
the psychological eﬀect (Cox 1997). The assumption of rational individuals vot-
ing strategically has been intensively used as a tool in formal models, on which
are based most of the contemporary works on electoral systems (Taagepera
2007). In this vein, Cox (1997) and Myerson & Weber (1993) have provided
models of elections using the assumption of strategic voters which yield results
compatible with Duverger’s observations.
These models have had widespread appeal but are simultaneously extensively
debated (Green & Shapiro 1994). In particular, the assumption of rational
forward-looking voters seems to be at odd with a number of empirical studies
of voters’ behaviour. Following the lines of the pessimistic view of the 19th
century elitist theories, decades of survey research have concluded to the limited
capacities of the electorate to behave rationally, lacking coherence of preferences
(Lazarsfeld & al. 1948), lacking basic information about political facts and
institutional procedures (Delli, Caprini & Keeter 1991), and lacking cognitive
skills to elaborate complex strategies (for comprehensive and critical review,
see Kinder 1983, Sniderman 1993 and Kuklinski & Quirk 2000). In his survey
of strategic voting in the UK, Fisher (2004 : 163) posits that ”no one fulfils
the abstract conception of a short-term instrumentally rational voter in real
life”. Yet, Riker claims that ”the evidence renders it undeniable that a large
amount of sophisticated voting occurs — mostly to the disadvantage of the third
parties nationally- so that the force of Duverger’s psychological factor must be
considerable” (Riker 1982: 764).
This obvious contradiction between two streams of literature needs some
clarification. Testing the existence of rational strategic behaviour at the indi-
vidual level with survey data is not an easy task. Indeed, rational choice theory
postulates that voters cast their vote in order to maximize some expected util-
ity function, given their beliefs on how other voters will behave in the election.
Testing for this kind of behaviour requires measuring voters’ preferences among
the various candidates as well as their beliefs on how their own vote will aﬀect
the outcome of the election.
One route to test for rational strategic behaviour from electoral survey data
has been to use proxies for voters’ relevant beliefs such as the viability of can-
didates (for a review, see for instance Alvarez & Nagler 2000, Blais & Bodet
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2006). The basic approach is to determine whether the so-called viability of can-
didates (the likelihood that they win the election) is significant when modelling
individual vote choice. This is generally considered as an approximation of the
core idea of the rational choice theory of voting, i.e. that voters try to maximize
the utility of their vote. However, these proxies are a ’far cry’ from the concept
of a pivotal vote, which is central in the rational choice model (Aldrich 1993).
To overcome these diﬃculties, this paper proposes to study strategic voting
in the laboratory. The experiments we report diﬀer from other laboratory exper-
iments (for instance Felsenthal 1990, Forsythe & al. 1993 and 1996, Béhue & al.
2008, Morton & Rietz 2008) by important features: we have a larger number of
voters participating in each election (21 or 63 voters) and a more fragmented set
of options to be selected (five candidates instead of three usually). We use four
diﬀerent electoral systems: besides the traditional one round plurality method
(labelled 1R) and two-round majority system (2R) – on which the main part
of the analysis will focus – we include approval voting (AV) and the single
transferable vote with Hare transfers (STV).
This experimental setting allows us to control for individual preferences for
the various candidates (which are monetary induced) and for the information
they have regarding the respective chances of various candidates. The aim of
this paper is to test whether people, in a favourable context, are able to make
the kind of computations and reasoning assumed by rational choice theory. For
additional analyses of the same experiments, see Blais & al. (2007, 2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes
the experiments. The following section presents the results and tests how well
sincere voting, strategic voting, or the use of heuristics fare in explaining indi-
vidual behaviour. Section 4 suggests a cognitive explanation to our findings and
section 5 concludes. Supplementary material is provided in the Appendix.
2 The experimental protocol
This article is based on experiments conducted in Lille, Montreal and Paris.
The basic feature of these experiments has participants (students) voting in
order to chose one of five possible outcomes, described as “candidates”. Voters
are fully informed about the diﬀerent specifications described below and the
elections are performed by series of four, the results of each election being made
public each time immediately. Cooperation and communication among voters
are banned. The main treatment is to vary the electoral system. The two first
series of elections were alternatively held under 1R and 2R. In Paris, one more
series of elections was held under Single Transferable Vote or Approval Voting.
The basic protocol is as follows. 21 (or sometime 63) subjects vote among
five alternative candidates, located at five distinct points on a left-right axis
that goes from 0 to 20: an extreme left candidate, a moderate left, a centrist, a
moderate right, and an extreme right (see Figure 1).
Each subject is assigned a position on this axis, which determines the payoﬀ
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she will earn. The monetary incentive for a subject is that the elected candidate
be as close as possible to her position. Precisely, the subjects are informed that
they will be paid 20 Euros (or Canadian dollars) minus the distance between
the elected candidate’s position and their own assigned position. For instance
(this is the example given in the instructions), a voter whose assigned position
is 11 will receive 10 euros if candidate A wins, 12 if E wins, 15 if B, 17 if D, and
19 if C. In the experiment (as in real life) it is in the voter’s interest that the
elected candidate be as close as possible to her own position.
The set of options and the payoﬀ scheme are identical for all elections. In
each group, 2 or 3 series of 4 elections are held successively. The four elections
are held with the same voting rule. For each series the participants are assigned
a randomly drawn position on the 0 to 20 axis. There are a total of 21 positions,
and each participant has a diﬀerent position. (For large groups three students
have the same position.) The participants are informed about the distribution of
positions: they know their own position, they know that each possible position
is filled exactly once (or thrice in sessions with 63 students) but they do not
know by whom. Voting is anonymous. After each election, ballots are counted
and the results (the five candidate scores) are publicly announced.1
After the initial series of four elections, the participants are assigned new
positions and the group moves to the second set of four elections, held under
a diﬀerent rule and, in some sessions, to a third series of four elections. The
participants are informed from the beginning that one of the eight or twelve
elections will be randomly drawn as the ”decisive” election, the one which will
actually determine the payoﬀs.2 .
We performed 23 such sessions in Lille, Montreal, and Paris, with a total of
734 participants. More precise information about each experiment is provided
in Table 1, which indicates the order in which series of four elections were held
within each session and the number of participants.3
.
3 Results
3.1 Aggregate electoral outcomes
The overall results are as follows. Table 2 shows the aggregate results for all
elections and Table 3 the same results restricted to the last two elections of
each series of four. The extremist candidates (A and E) are never elected. In
1For STV elections, the whole counting process occurs publicly in front of the students,
eliminating the candidate with the lowest score and transferring ballots from one candidate
to the other.
2This is customary in Experimental Economics; it has the advantage of keeping the subjects
equally interested in all elections and of avoiding insurance eﬀects; see Davis & Holt (1993).
3 Small groups are made of 21 participants with one participant per position and large
groups have 63 participants with 3 participants per position. In two large sessions held in
adjacent rooms a mistake occurred so that the numbers are 61 and 64. This is of no importance
for the analysis performed in the present paper, we therefore keep these data.
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Figure 1: Positions of the five candidates
Place Date Group Electoral
size system
1 Paris 06/13/2006 21 2R/1R
2 Paris 12/11/2006 21 2R/1R/AV
3 Paris 12/11/2006 21 1R/2R/AV
4 Paris 12/13/2006 21 2R/1R/AV
5 Paris 12/13/2006 21 1R/2R/AV
6 Paris 12/18/2006 21 2R/1R/STV
7 Paris 12/18/2006 21 1R/2R/STV
8 Paris 12/19/2006 21 2R/1R/STV
9 Paris 12/19/2006 21 1R/2R/STV
10 Paris 1/15/2007 21 2R/1R/AV
11 Paris 1/15/2007 21 1R/2R/AV
12 Lille 12/18/2006 21 2R/1R
13 Lille 12/18/2006 21 1R/2R
14 Lille 12/18/2006 61 2R/1R
15 Lille 12/18/2006 64 1R/2R
16 Montreal 2/19/2007 21 1R/2R
17 Montreal 2/19/2007 21 2R/1R
18 Montreal 2/20/2007 21 1R/2R
19 Montreal 2/20/2007 21 2R/1R
20 Montreal 2/21/2007 63 1R/2R
21 Montreal 2/21/2007 63 2R/1R
22 Montreal 2/22/2007 63 1R/2R
23 Montreal 2/22/2007 63 2R/1R
Table 1: The 16 sessions
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1R 2R AV STV
C 49 % 54 % 79 % 0
B or D 51 % 45 % 21 % 100 %
A or E 0 0 0 0
total 92 92 24 16
Table 2: Elections Won (all)
1R 2R AV STV
C 52 % 50 % 100 % 0
B or D 48 % 50 % 0 100 %
A or E 0 0 0 0
total 46 46 12 8
Table 3: Elections Won (last two)
1R elections candidate C (the centrist candidate, a Condorcet winner in our
case) is elected in about half of the elections, and candidates B or D are elected
in the remaining half (with B being elected more often than D). In 2R elections,
the picture is similar but in AV elections and STV elections, it is very diﬀerent.
In AV elections, C is almost always elected, and in STV elections, C is never
elected.
If one looks more precisely at the chronological order of the elections (from
the first to the fourth for a given voting system), one finds clear path-dependence
eﬀects for 1R and 2R elections. Tables 11 and 12 in the Appendix indicate the
percentage of votes (averaged over our 23 sessions) obtained by the candidates
ranked first, second, third, fourth and last, and how these figures change with
time. Table 13 is the same for Approval Voting, the relative score of a candidate
being the percentage of voters who vote for the candidate (these percentages
thus does not sum to one). Single Transferable Vote is not a score method, but
one can compute the Borda scores of the candidates in the STV ballots and this
is how Table 14 is computed.
Figures ?? to 5 depict these numbers. One can see that as time goes, votes
gather on two (for 1R elections) or three (for 2R elections) candidates. The three
viable candidates are always the same for 2R elections (candidates B,C,D), but
for 1R elections the pair of viable candidates may change among these three
candidates. The pictures for AV and STV do not show any time-dependence
eﬀect.
These aggregate results show that our protocol is able to implement in the
laboratory several of the theoretical issues about voting rules: with the same
preference profile, voting rules designate the Condorcet winner (Approval Vot-
ing), or not (STV), or designate a candidate which depends on history (1R and
2R).
The path-dependence observed at the aggregate level for 1R and 2R votes is
an indication that the behaviour of a voter should be studied as a response the
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history of the votes.
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3.2 Three models of individual behaviour
We start with an analysis of individual behaviour for 1R and 2R elections. We
present and compare three theoretical models that could account for individual
vote choice. Section 3.3 tests the models with the data.
Note that in a second round of a two-round election, the choice faced by
voters is very simple: they have to vote for one candidate among the two run-oﬀ
candidates. In particular, voting for the candidate associated with the highest
monetary payoﬀ is a dominant strategy. Therefore, the models we propose
below are intended to describe behaviour in the first round of 2R elections; in
the sequel, when we talk about behaviour and scores in 2R elections, unless
otherwise specified, we mean behaviour and scores in the first round.
3.2.1 Sincere voting
For 1R and 2R elections, the simplest behaviour than can be postulated is “Sin-
cere” voting, which means that the individual votes for the candidate whose posi-
tion is closest to her own position. To be more specific, we introduce the following
notation: there are I voters, i = 1, 2, ..., I, and 5 candidates : A,B,C,D,E. The
monetary payoﬀ received by voter i if candidate c wins the election is denoted
by ui(c). In plurality one round and majority two round elections, individual i
votes for a candidate v∗ such that:
ui(v
∗) = max
v∈{A,B,C,D,E}
ui(v).
This model makes a unique prediction as to how a voter should vote, except
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if the voter’s position is precisely in between two adjacent candidates, which
is the case of voters on the 8th and 12th position on our axis. The sincere
prediction does not depend on history.
3.2.2 Strategic voting
By strategic behaviour we mean that an individual, at a given date t, chooses an
action (a vote) which maximizes her expected utility given her belief about how
the other voters will vote in the current election. Strategic voting is understood,
in this paper, in the strict rational choice perspective (see Downs 1957, Myerson
& Weber 1993).4 We assume that voters are purely instrumental and that there
is no expressive voting, so that the only outcome that matters is who wins and
the utility of a voter is her monetary payoﬀ.
For each candidate v, voters evaluate the likelihood of the potential outcomes
of the election (who wins the election) if they vote for candidate v, and they
compute the associated expected utility. They vote for the candidate yielding
the highest expected utility.
To be more specific, let us denote by pi(c, v) the subjective probability that
voter i assigns to the event “candidate c wins the election”, conditional on her
casting her ballot for candidate v5 . Given these beliefs, if voter i votes for
candidate v, she gets the expected utility
Wi(v) =
X
c
pi(c, v)ui(c).
Individual i votes for a candidate v∗ such that:
Wi(v
∗) = max
v∈{A,B,C,D,E}
Wi(v).
For example, if candidate c is perceived to be a sure winner then whatever
the vote decision v of voter i is, pi(c, v) = 1 and pi(c0, v) = 0, for all c0 other
that c. In such a case, voter i gets the same expected utility whoever she votes
for, since candidate c will be elected no matter what she does. In that case,
Wi(v) = ui(c), for all v ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}. Any vote is compatible with the
strategic model in that case.
This model leaves open the question of the form of the probabilities pi(c, v),
which reflect the predictions that voter i makes regarding other voters’ behav-
iour, and so one has to make some specific assumptions regarding these proba-
bilities. A first possibility, that we call the “rational expectation” assumption,
is simply to assume that voters’ beliefs about other voters’ behavior are correct.
This assumption is common in Economic Theory. It lacks realism because it
4Note that the definition of strategic voting we use here does not coincide with that which
is sometimes given in the literature in political science. Indeed, this literature has traditionally
opposed a sincere and a strategic (or sophisticated) voter, where a voter is said to be strategic
only when she deserts her preferred option (Alvarez & Nagler 2000; Cox 1997). Such strategic
voting needs not be utility maximizing..
5with
P
c
pi(c, v) = 1, for all v.
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amounts to postulate that the voter “knows” something which has not taken
place yet, but it is theoretically attractive because it avoids the delicate question
of the belief formation process. A second possibility, that we call the “myopic”
assumption, is to assume that each voter forms her beliefs about how other
voters will behave in the current election based on the results of the previous
election and thinks that other voters will behave in the current election just as
they did in the previous election.6 A “myopic” theory only makes prediction for
the second, third, and fourth elections in each series (t = 2, 3 or 4). It does not
predict how voters behave before they observe any results. On the other hand
the rational expectation hypothesis makes predictions even for the first date.
Myopic beliefs as well as rational expectations or any other kind of beliefs,
can be precise or approximate. The former assumption will be labelled “noise-
less” and the latter “noisy”. Under the “noisy rational expectation” the voter
is supposed to know approximately the other voters’ actual vote (see table 4).
Under the “noisy myopic” assumption the voter believes that the other voters’
current vote will be approximately the same as the previous vote. Noisy models
draw on the refinement literature from Game Theory and consider “trembled”
beliefs (Selten, 1975; see Myerson, 1991 ch. 5). We make the hypothesis that
the individual believes that the votes of the other participants will be very close
to, but not exactly equal to, what they are supposed to be. Precisely,each voter
considers that with a small probability ε, exactly one other voter is going to
make a mistake, by deviating from her postulated action and voting with an
equal probability for any of the remaining four candidates.
Note that with the noiseless assumption, the only case where a voter is piv-
otal – and thus where she is not indiﬀerent – is when the vote gap between
the first two candidates is strictly less that 2 (either 1 or 0). The introduction
of a small noise increases the chances that any voter becomes pivotal: under
this assumption, a voter can be pivotal when the vote gap between the first
two candidates in strictly less that 4 (and not 2 as under the noiseless assump-
tion). When there is a unique best response for the voter under the noiseless
assumption, this action is still the unique best response when there are very
small “trembles” in other voters’ votes (ε small); but when the best response
under the noiseless assumption is not unique, considering small trembles may
break ties among the candidates in this set.
This noisy assumption seems more reasonable from a cognitive point of view;
and is also preferable from a methodological point of view because it more often
yields unique predictions.7
The Appendix describes precisely how to derive the pi(c, v) probabilities
under the various assumptions and for the diﬀerent voting rules. We performed
6All this applies to 1R-elections and to the first rounf of 2R-elections. Now, in 2-round
elections, these pi(c, v) involve both beliefs as to how voters will behave at the second round
(if any), and beliefs as to how voters will behave at the first round. We assume that each voter
anticipates that at the second round (if any), each voter will vote for the candidate closest to
her position, and will toss a coin if the two run-oﬀ candidates are equally close to her position.
7 If a voter knows precisely how the other voters will vote, she will generally conclude that
her own vote does not matter.
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Beliefs are based on Beliefs are based on
accurate anticipations recent history
Beliefs are perfect Noiseless rational Noiseless myopic
Beliefs are approximate Noisy rational Noisy myopic
Table 4: Beliefs specifications
analyses based on these four diﬀerent assumptions. Analyses under the rational
and the myopic expectations turn out to yield very similar results (see the
Appendix). For ease of exposition, we report in the main text only the findings
based on the noisy rational expectation assumption.
3.2.3 Heuristics
The third set of models tested in this paper is based on the idea of bounded
rationality. Over the past two decades, several authors have discussed the con-
clusion of limited competence of citizens from the observation of widespread
political ignorance. As Sniderman et al. (1991), Popkin (1991), and Lupia and
McCubbins (1998) have argued, it is possible for people to reason about politics
without a large amount of knowledge thanks to heuristics. Heuristics, in this
context, can be defined as ‘judgemental shortcuts, eﬃcient ways to organize
and simplify political choice, eﬃcient in the double sense of requiring relatively
little information to execute, and yielding dependable answers even to complex
problems of choice’ (Sniderman et al. 1991: 19). We focus in this paper on a
specific type of heuristics, linked to the structure of competition rather than on
policies or issues (in the same perspective, see Patty 2007, Lago 2008, Laslier
2008).
Building on the literature on electoral systems, the heuristics we are inter-
ested in define the viability of candidates. Rather than engaging in complex
computations as assumed in the strategic voting model, voters rely on a prin-
ciple of choice in a restricted menu. The general idea of the heuristics is that
voters vote sincerely in the set of viable candidates. The viability of candidates
is defined by a general rule, specific to each electoral system. From the rule
given by Gary Cox (1997) that there are M + 1 viable candidates, M being
the district magnitude, we test two heuristics. The “Top-Two heuristics” posits
that voters choose the candidate they feel closer to among the candidates who
obtained the two highest scores in the previous election. This rule should apply
to 1R electoral systems. The “Top-Three heuristics” posits that voters choose
the candidate they feel closer to among the top three candidates. This heuris-
tics should apply to 2R electoral systems since the first round of 2R system can
be viewed as having a magnitude of two, two candidates moving to the second
round.
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1R Sincere Strategic Top-Two Top-Three
% correct predictions 49.4% 72.5% 72.0% 69.1%
(testable predictions) 1985 1358 2083 2000
Table 5: Model performance for 1R elections
3.3 Test of the models
The general approach is to compare the predictions of the theoretical models
with the observations. It consists in computing for each theory the predictions
in terms of individual voting behaviour and to determine how many times these
predictions coincide with observations (Hildebrand & al. 1977).
The main developments are dedicated to 1R and 2R elections. AV and STV
will help to strengthen our general argument. Our main conclusion is that the
rational theory of strategic voting performs surprisingly well but only in simple
contexts. As soon as strictly rational strategies become more complex or less
intuitive, people apparently use shortcuts and their behaviour is better captured
by a heuristics framework
3.3.1 Results for One-Round elections
Table 5 indicates the percentage of correct predictions for the various theories.
We use the noisy rational version of Strategic voting. The percentages are
computed only on the cases where the theory makes a unique and testable
prediction. We consider only the data relative to dates 2 to 4. Not taking the
first date into account allows to compare the myopic and rational expectations
assumptions (this is done in the Appendix); moreover we already know that
learning is taking place, so the initial elections are hardy comparable with the
others. Detailed statistics by date , details of the test that we performed, with a
complete description of the theories, are presented in the Appendix in subsection
7.2.
Sincere voting is clearly not as good as the other theories in that case. It
makes a unique prediction except if the voter’s position is precisely in between
two adjacent candidates (case of voters on the 8th and 12th position of our axis).
If we restrict attention to the cases of unique predictions, we observe that the
sincere voting theory is performing rather poorly: The theory explains about
49% of the votes on average for elections 2 to 4, and this figure is decreasing
with time: in the first election of the series of four it is 69% but in the last
elections it is 45%. (See Table 15 and more details on the sincere theory in 1R
elections in subsection 7.2.1).
The Strategic and Top-Two theories perform very well and indeed they are
almost identical in that case, both in principle and in practice; the diﬀerence
is that the strategic theory (in the version we use) does not provide a unique
recommendation when the first-ranked candidate is two or more votes ahead
of the second-ranked one. Surprisingly the Top-Three theory works quite well
too. To explain this fact, note that the Top-Two and Top-Three theories diﬀer
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2R Sincere Strategic Top-Two Top-Three
% correct predictions 58.1% 59.2 % 61.3% 72.7%
(testable predictions) 1989 375 2080 1987
Table 6: Model performance for 2R elections
essentially when the voter’s preferred candidate among candidates B,C and D
is ranked third. This is for instance the case for an extreme-right voter when D
is ranked third after B and C. In such a case the voter may desert her sincere
choice E but still not move to support C against B, like the Strategic and
Top-Two theories would command, and instead move to support the moderate
candidate D.
The figures are given here using the “Rational expectations” version of the
theories. The findings are the same using the “myopic” versions (see the Ap-
pendix). The analysis date by date confirms that Sincere voting is decreasing
with time, and Strategic or Top-Two voting are increasing.
We conclude that, in 1R elections, our subjects essentially behave in accor-
dance with the Strategic paradigm and the Top-Two heuristics. Sincere voting
is clearly the least satisfactory model. Both the heuristics and the strategic
models perform much better. The former has the advantage of yielding more
unique predictions. The latter has the virtue of being grounded on more solid
theoretical foundations. This seems to us a particularly important considera-
tion, and so we are inclined to conclude that the rational strategic model is the
most interesting in this case.
Remark on the number of unique predictions in the strategic models. Note
that a way to obtain more unique predictions in the strategic model would be to
increase the level of noise. Under the noiseless assumption, the anticipations are
extremely precise. Under the noisy assumption as postulated here, each voter
considers that with a small probability ε, exactly one other voter is going
to make a mistake, by deviating from her postulated action and voting with an
equal probability for any of the remaining four candidates. A further refinement
would be to assume that with a smaller probability (say ε2), exactly two other
voters are going to make a mistake, by deviating from their postulated action
and voting with an equal probability for any of the remaining four candidates. In
the approval strategic section, this is actually the route we follow, by assuming
that any number of mistakes is possible (with decreasing probability), see
subsection 3.3.3.
3.3.2 Results for Two-Round elections
Table 6 compares models for the first round of 2R elections. Again, Sincere
voting is not satisfactory, but, contrary to the previous case, the strategic the-
ory does not perform much better. The best predictor is here the Top-Three
heuristics. Its predictive power is high (72.7% on average) and increasing with
time (74.7% for fourth elections, see the Appendix).
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The conclusion here is quite clear as to the relative success of the theories:
the simple Top-Three heuristics beats both the sincere and the strategic theories.
3.3.3 Results for Approval Voting
Sincerity under Approval voting The definition of “sincere” voting un-
der AV is that a voting ballot is sincere if and only if there do not exist two
candidates a and b such that the voter strictly prefers a to b and nevertheless
approves of b and not of a. With this definition we can count, in our data at
each election and for each voter the number of pairs (a, b) of candidates such as
a violation of sincere voting is observed. Such violation of sincere voting is very
rare in our data: 78 observed pairs out of 5040, that is 1.5%.
This definition of sincere voting leaves one degree of freedom to the voter
since it does not specify at which level, given her own ranking of the candidates,
the voter should place her threshold of approbation. With 5 candidates most
voters have 6 sincere ballots (including the “full” and the”empty” ballots).
Consequently the notion of “Sincere voting” does not provide a predictive
theory in the case of Approval Voting and thus cannot be compared with other
theories.
Strategic behaviour under Approval voting In order to make strategic
predictions at the individual level, we use a slitghtly diﬀerent scheme from the
one we used for 1R and 2R elections. The reason is that, with this voting rule,
the voter is asked to provide a vote (positive or negative) about all candidates,
including those who have virtually no chance of winning according to the voter’s
own belief. In 1R and 2R elections, under the noisy assumption as we defined it,
a voter assumed that with a small probability, exactly one voter would make
a mistake (from the refernce situation). The probability put on higher "orders
of mistakes" (two voters make a mistake, three voters make a mistake, ...) was
zero. With AV, this model does not produce a unique prediction as to how
a voter should fill her ballot. Instead, we use in that case a model with much
higher levels of uncertainty, by putting some positive probabilities on all possible
events (although the probability is exponentially decreasing with the number of
mistakes). We do not compute with computers the probabilities of the various
outcomes in that case, and instead borrow from the literature on strategic voting
under AV (see Laslier 20088). It turns out that the maximization of expected
utility under such a belief is easy to perform and often provides a unique strategic
recommendation (Laslier 2008). This prediction can be described as follows. The
voter focuses on the candidate who is obtaining the largest number of votes, say
a1. All other candidates are evaluated with respect to this leading candidate a1:
the voter approves all candidates she prefers to a1 and disapproves all candidates
8who considers the following voter belief: The voter anticipates the result of the election
(the number of approvals that he or she thinks a candidate is to receive, not including the
individual’s own approval) and she tells herself : “if my vote is to break a tie, that will be
between two (and only two) candidates and that might occur because any other voter, with
respect to any candidate, can independently make a mistake with some small probability ε.
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Approval =1 Approval=0 total
Prediction=1 590 157 747
Prediction=0 69 982 1051
total 659 1139 1798
Table 7: AV: 88% of approbations predicted by the“strategic" model
Approval =1 Approval=0 total
Prediction=1 619 119 738
Prediction=0 121 995 1116
total 740 1114 1854
Table 8: AV: 87% of approbations predicted by the“best two" model
she finds worse than a1. The leading candidate is evaluated by comparison with
the second-ranked candidate (the “main challenger”): the voter approves the
leading candidate if and only if she prefers this candidate to the main challenger.
The voter therefore places her “Approval threshold” around the main candidate,
either just above or just below.
Details of this “leading candidate” theory are provided in the Appendix. It
produces 1798 unique predictions out of 21 ∗ 6 ∗ 5 ∗ 3 = 1890 votes. The unique
predictions are correct in 590+982 = 1572 cases out of 1798, that is 87%, as one
can see in Table 7. The Table distinguishes these predictions, right or wrong,
according to the observed vote. The theory tends to slightly overestimate the
number of approved candidates.
Heuristics for Approval voting The strategic model described above leads
to behavioral recommendations which are very simple: Place your “Approval
threshold” around the main candidate, either just above or just below. There-
fore, we suspect that any simple heuristic based on the viability of candidates
(as are the top-two or top-three heuristics used for 1R and 2R elections) would
yield similar recommendations.9
Rather, we present here the test for a heuristic that, contrary to those de-
velopped sor far, does not rely on the viability of the candidates. We also tested
for the heuristics model which simply predicts that the voter approves her two
preferred candidates. Table 8 indicates the predictions of this theory relative to
the last three periods of each series (for the sake of comparison). The number
of observations is 1890 votes and we have 1854 unique predictions.10 On the set
of possible predictions this simple theory predicts 619 + 995 = 1615 votes, that
is 87% .
9 Such an adaptation of the "top-two" heuristic to AV would be the following. Consider
the two candidates that get the highest number of votes in the reference election (not taking
into account the voter’s own ballot). The voter should approve of the candidate she likes best
among these two candidates, as well as all the candidates that she ranks higher.
10The prediction is not unique when a voter has the same utility for two candidates.
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Of course this nice result (87% of explained votes) is due to the fact that we
calibrated the theory to an observed variable: the average number of approval
per ballot is about 2, so it is quite clear that the “Best two” heuristics works
better here than the “Best one” or the “Best three” heuristics.
Conclusion on Approval voting Under approval voting, the Sincere voting
paradigm does not provide clear predictions. Votes are well predicted by the
Strategic theory and by a “Best two” heuristics. On the face of the present
experiment, we cannot distinguish between these. But notice that, in other
circumstances, the average number of approbations per ballot might be notably
diﬀerent. For instance Laslier and Van der Straeten 2008, in a quite diﬀerent
setting, report an average number of approval of 3.15 out of 16 candidates. In
such a case it is clear that the “Best two” heuristics will be invalidated. We thus
conclude in favour of the strategic theory for Approval voting.
3.3.4 Results for Single Transferable Vote (Hare method)
Under this voting rule, voters have many diﬀerent ballots at their disposal since
they are asked to submit a complete ranking of candidates. For 5 candidates,
there are 121 possible ballots. We look for violations of sincere voting by counting
the number of pairs of candidates (a, b) such that a voter strictly prefers a to b
but nevertheless ranks b higher than a in her ballot. There are 5972 such pairs,
of which only 600, that is 10%, violate sincerity. We therefore find that sincerity
is satisfied at 90% for this voting rule.
This simple observation enables us to understand what has been observed
in our STV elections. Since voters vote (approximately) sincerely, given our
preference profile the two extremes candidates – who receive the votes of the
extreme voters – are always eliminated first. Then (for the third round of
the vote transfers), the two moderate candidates have more votes than the
centrist candidate, who has received no transferred votes. Therefore the centrist
candidate, despite being a Condorcet winner, is always eliminated at the third
round.
Sincere voting is clearly a satisfactory theory here. Note that the published
literature on this voting rule does not propose, to our knowledge, a practical
solution to the question of individual strategic voting under STV with five can-
didates. We (so far) did not attempt to compute the rational recommendation
at the individual level for this voting rule as we did for other rules. These
computations would be similar, but much more complex than those for 2R elec-
tions. In particular, these computations would entail specifying each voter’s
beliefs regarding how all other voters filed their ballots (in order to be able to
proceed to the successive eliminations of candidates). The assumption of ratio-
nal anticipations in that case seems hard to take in. and the myopic version
would entail specifying voters’ beliefs about the part of the abllots that they did
not learn during the previous counting of ballots (although the whole counting
process occurs in front of the subjects, only some (little) part of the relevant
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1R 2R
Sincere 49% 58%
Strategic 72% 59%
Top-Two 72% 61%
Top-Three 69% 73%
Table 9: Comparing models on unique predictions, all last three elections
information to compute an optimal response is learned through it). Therefore,
we did not attempt to test the strategic models for this voting rule.
4 A cognitive explanation
Table 9 compares models and voting rules by presenting the explanatory power
of various theories for 1R and 2R elections
As already mentioned, the first result is that sincere voting theory is not able
to explain much of what we observed in 1R and 2R elections. In 1R elections the
“explanatory power” of this theory is on average close to 50% and is decreasing
with time. In 2R elections, it is 58%, also decreasing. Strategic theory explains
well the data in 1R elections (72%, increasing) but not in 2R elections (59%).
This is the puzzle we will now try to solve: Why does rational behaviour explains
the data in 1R elections but not in 2R elections?
One point is common to strategic behaviour in both cases: one should not
vote for a candidate who has no chance to play a role in the election. In our data
set, it is clear that, in all elections, the two extreme candidates had no chance.
Based on this idea, it is easy to find a theory which explains well individual
behaviour in our 2R elections. Suppose that the voters vote for their (sincerely)
preferred candidates among the three candidates who obtain the most votes in
the last election. This “Top-Three” theory has a predictive power of 73% (out
of 1987) in 2R elections. This point is perfectly in line with the remark that
precisely three candidates are viable in 2R elections. The “Top-Two” theory
(preferred candidate among the two candidates who obtain the most votes in
the last election) does not do well for 2R elections (61%, decreasing) but is a
very reasonable theory for 1R elections (72%, increasing).
In order to understand better why individual behaviour is deviating from
strict rationality in 2R elections, we now restrict our attention to the cases
when sincere voting is unique but is not “rational”. Strategic voting (in the
noisy rational version) makes a unique prediction and Sincere voting makes
another, diﬀerent, one. These are the cases where the individual is facing a
dilemma. Table 10 reports how she is resolving this dilemma, depending on her
position; the numbers in this Table indicates the percentage of dilemmas which
are resolved by a sincere (and thus irrational) choice.
One can see that in 2R elections moderate voters whose strategic recommen-
dation (following our noisy model) would contradict their sincere vote prefer (at
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1R 2R
Extremists (0-3, 17-20) 86/439 = 20% 11/43 = 26%
Moderates (4-7, 13-16) 68/147 = 46% 74/91 = 81%
Centrists (8-12) 28/56 = 50% 6/13 = 46%
Table 10: Sincere choice in front of a dilemma
81%) to follow the sincere recommendation. These individuals are for most of
them located at positions 7 and 13. Consider for instance the voter at position
7. She earns 19, 17 or 13 when candidates B, C or D is elected. According to
our model, she anticipates that she will earn 17 if C goes to the second round
because C will then be elected. If the second round is B against D, she has
the expected utility: (19+13)/2 = 16. Such a voter should rationaly vote for C
because promoting C to the second round is the best way to avoid the election
of the bad candidate D. It seems that this kind of reasoning leading to “inverse
strategic voting” (Blais 2004) is not followed by our subjects. On the other hand
extremists voters in 1R election massively follow the strategic recommendation
rather than the sincere one, under both voting rules.
This suggests that our subjects voted strategically when the strategic rec-
ommendation is simply to desert a candidate who is behaving poorly, but they
do not vote strategically when strategic reasoning asks for a more sophisticated
and counter-intuititve calculus. This conclusion is in line with our findings about
Approval voting. Voting strategically under Approval voting is not diﬃcult for
the voter, and it never contradicts a basic notion of “sincerity”: the voter es-
sentially defines “good” and “bad” candidates by comparison with the most
serious candidate. On the contrary, the logical computations required for vot-
ing strategically under STV are extremely complexe. We observed that voters
voted sincerely under this voting rule. This is in line with the actual prac-
tice of similar systems in countries where parties oﬀer to take away from the
voter the burden of strategic reasoning by recommending a whole ranking of the
candidates (see Farrell & McAllister 2006).
5 Conclusion
Reporting on a laboratory experiment on voting under diﬀerent electoral sys-
tems, this article has compared three models to explain voting decisions at the
individual level. The first model is based on the notion of sincere voting, the
second relies on the rational choice theory, and the third on heuristics. We have
shown that these diﬀerent approaches perform diﬀerently under diﬀerent voting
rules.
We define Sincere voting in the usual way, which raises no problem in the
laboratory since individual preferences are controlled. Sincere voting can then
be meaningfully tested for most voting rules, except for Approval voting.
Strategic voting is defined following the rational choice paradigm as the max-
imization of expected utility, given a utility function and a subjective probability
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distribution (“belief”) on the possible consequences of actions. Utilities are con-
trolled as monetary payoﬀs. Beliefs are endogenous to the history of elections,
and we showed that two reasonable forms of beliefs (“rational anticipations”
and “myopic anticipations”) yield the same conclusions.
The heuristics considered in this paper are to vote for the preferred candi-
date among the two (“Top-Two”) or three (“Top-Three”) candidates who are
perceived as the most likely to win. These heuristics rely on the same beliefs as
Strategic voting and we have again shown that rational and myopic anticipations
yield the same conclusions.
For One-round elections, the sincere voting model behaves very poorly be-
cause it fails to predict the desertion of un-viable candidates. Strategic voting
is a good model in that case and is essentially identical (in principle and in
practice) to the Top-Two heuristics.
For Two-round elections, the best theory is the Top-Three heuristics. We
observe that un-viable candidates are also deserted (which invalidates Sincere
voting); but when strategic computations lead to paradoxical conclusions such
as voting for a disliked candidate in order to increase its chances to be present in
the second round, these recommendations are not followed. This is inconsistent
with Strategic voting as we defined it and thus explains the limited perforance
of this models in the context of two round elections.
We therefore conclude that voters tend to vote strategically as far as the
strategic reasoning is not too complex, in which case they rely on simple heuris-
tics.
Our observations on Approval voting and Single Transferable vote confirm
this hypothesis. In the case of Approval voting, strategic voting is simple and
produces no paradoxical conclusions; we observe that our subjects voted strate-
gically under this system. On the contrary, voting strategically under STV is a
mathematical puzzle; and we observed that voters voted sincerely under STV.
This article has departed from classical approaches to strategic voting. Rather
than estimating the role of diﬀerent factors in the econometric “vote equation”,
we proposed to compute directly predictions of individual behaviours accord-
ing to several theories (sincere voting, strategic voting and voting according to
behavioural heuristics). The main results of this study underline the good per-
formance of the strategic voting theory to explain the behaviour of our subjects
in One-round plurality elections or Approval voting. Support for this theory is
however weaker in more complex settings, such as run-oﬀ elections and STV, for
which other theories outperform strategic voting theory in explaining individual
decisions.11
The amount of “unsincere” voting observed in our experiments appears to
be higher than that reported in studies based on surveys (see, especially, the
summary table provided in Alvarez and Nagler 2000), though such comparisons
are diﬃcult to make because sincere and strategic choices are not defined the
same way. This is not strictly due to the limitations in size of our groups of
11 If one was to define “strategic” voting as voting non-sincerely then our results about
Two-round elections would validate the strategic hypothesis, but we choose a more precise
definition of strategic voting.
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students, though this experiment has obviously taken the form of voting in
committees. The variation from 21 to 63 subjects has not lead to significant
change in our results (see also Blais et al. 2008).
Why this amount of unsincere voting is so high on our setup? We would
suggest three possibilities. First the amount of unsincere voting may depend
on the number of candidates. We had five candidates in our setup, while most
survey-based studies are restricted to three parties. Further work is needed,
both experimental and survey-based, to determine how the propensity to vote
sincerely is aﬀected by the number of candidates. Secondly, our findings show
that the amount of sincere voting declines over time, which indicates that some
of our participants learn that they may be better oﬀ voting unsincerely. This
raises the question whether voters in the real life, where an election is not
followed immediately by another election, still manage to learn over time. Third,
in our setup participants had a clear rank order of preferences among the five
candidates. Blais (2002) has speculated that perhaps many voters have a clear
preference for one candidate or party and are rather indiﬀerent among the other
options, which weakens any incentive to think strategically. We need better
survey evidence on that matter, and also other experiments in which some
voters are placed in such contexts. Anyway, the most likely answer is that this
experiment has little external validity in terms of estimation of level of sincere
or unsincere voting precisely because it has focussed on the line of reasoning
people follow in forming their vote choice.
Our main concern in this study has not been to estimate the amount of
sincere, strategic, or heuristic voting. The purpose has rather been to see how
three diﬀerent models could explain vote choice under diﬀerent voting rules. We
have shown that the sincere model works better for a very complex voting system
where strategic computations appear to be insurmountable, that the strategic
model performs well in simple systems, and that the heuristic perspective is most
relevant in situations of moderate complexity. These findings make eminent
sense. And it is a virtue of the experimental design to allow us to compare vote
choice under diﬀerent voting rules.
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candidates
dates
% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
t = 1 32.8 27.3 20.8 11.8 7.2
t = 2 39.2 33.5 18.2 6.2 2.9
t = 3 44.3 36.0 14.3 4.4 0.8
t = 4 51.3 36.0 8.7 3.3 0.5
Table 11: Ordered relative scores, by date : 1R
candidates
dates
% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
t = 1 31.7 26.0 21.0 12.6 8.8
t = 2 36.5 30.8 20.3 8.0 4.3
t = 3 38.5 32.2 20.2 6.2 3.0
t = 4 38.8 33.4 19.9 5.5 2.3
Table 12: Ordered relative scores, by date : 2R
7 Appendix
7.1 Time-dependency for agregate results
Tables 11 to 14 show the evolution of the ordered candidate scores for the four
electoral systems, they correspond to Figures ?? to ?? in the main text .
7.2 One Round elections
7.2.1 Sincere voting theory (1R)
Description. Individuals vote for any candidate that yields the highest payoﬀ
if elected. Individual i votes for a candidate v∗ such that:
ui(v
∗) = max
v∈{A,B,C,D,E}
ui(v).
Predictions. Sincere Voting is independent of time. For all voters except
those in position 8 and 12, this theory makes a unique prediction. Voters in po-
candidates
dates
% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
t = 1 56.3 50.0 42.9 30.2 25.4
t = 2 57.1 47.6 43.7 28.6 23.0
t = 3 53.2 46.0 43.7 28.6 21.4
t = 4 59.5 46.0 42.1 26.2 22.2
Table 13: Ordered relative scores, by date : AV
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candidates
dates
% 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
t = 1 56.3 50.0 42.9 30.2 25.4
t = 2 57.1 47.6 43.7 28.6 23.0
t = 3 53.2 46.0 43.7 28.6 21.4
t = 4 59.5 46.0 42.1 26.2 22.2
Table 14: Ordered Borda scores, by date : STV
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
1R 455662 = 69%
363
662 = 55%
322
661 = 49%
296
662 = 45%
1436
2647 = 54%
2R 489657 = 74%
406
663 = 61%
385
663 = 58%
363
663 = 55%
1643
2646 = 62%
Table 15: Sincere Voting for single-name elections
sition 8 are indiﬀerent between B and C and voters in position 12 are indiﬀerent
between D and C.
Test. When we restrict ourselves to unique testable predictions12, this theory
correctly predicts behaviour on 54% of the observations, but this figure hides an
important time-dependency: the predictive quality of the theory is decreasing
from 69% at the first election to 45% at the fourth one; see Table 15. which
also compares with 2R elections. 13
7.2.2 Strategic models in one-round elections
Strategic behaviour under the no-noise (ε = 0) assumption (1R)
Description with Rational Anticipations. Assumption 1 (No noise,
Rational Anticipations) : Each individual has a correct anticipation of the
vote of the other individuals at the current election.
In that case,the subjective probabilities pi(c, v) are constructed as follows.
Consider voter i at t-th election in a series (t = 1, 2, 3, 4). Voter i correctly
anticipates the scores of the candidates in election t, net of her own vote. The
subjective probabilities pi(c, v) are then easily derived. Let us denote by L the
set of first-ranked candidates (the leading candidates), and by F the set of
closest followers (considering only other voters’ votes). (i) If the follower(s) is
(are) at least two votes away from the leading candidate(s), if voter i votes for
(one of) the leading candigate(s), this candidate is elected with probability 1, if
she votes for any other candidate, there is a tie between the leading candidates
12A prediction, even unique, is not testable in the case of a missing or spoiled ballot, which
explains why the denominators in Table15 are not exactly the same. We should have 664
sincere predictions at each date, that is 2656 on the whole. There are very few missing or
spoiled ballots (about .3%).
13To compare with the other Tables, the figures in the main text are computed for dates 2
to 4. That is 981/1985 = 49.4% for 1R and 1154/1989 = 58.0% for 2R.
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1 2 3 4 5 total
823 18 30 343 1722 2936
28.0% 0.6% 1.0% 11.7% 58.7% 100%
Table 16: Multiple Predictions, ² = 0, 1R
(if there is only one leading candidate, he is elected for sure).14 (ii) If now
the two sets of candidates L and F are exactly one vote away: if voter i votes
for (one of) the leading candigate(s), this candidate is elected for sure; if she
votes for (one of) the followers, there is a tie between this candidate and the
leading candidates; if she votes for any other candidate, there is a tie between
the leading candidates.15
Predictions. Under these assumptions regarding the pi(c, v) , we com-
pute (using Mathematica software) for each election (starting from the second
election in each session) and for each individual, her expected utility when she
votes for candidate v ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}: that is Pc pi(c, v)ui(c). We then take
the maximum of these five values. If this maximum is reached for only one
candidate, we say that for this voter at that time, the theory makes a unique
prediction regarding how she should vote. If this maximum is reached for sev-
eral candidates, the theory only predicts a subset (which might be the whole
set) of candidates from which the voter should choose.
Consider for example a situation where, at the current election, one candi-
date is expected to be a clear leader (he is alone ahead by a three votes margin
or more). This candidate is expected to win for sure and no voter is pivotal.
Thus all voters are indiﬀerent between voting for any candidate. All ballots
yields the same expected payoﬀ for them, that is the monetary payoﬀ each gets
when that leading candidate is elected.
The table 16 gives the statistics regarding the number of candidates in this
subset. These figures are obtained considering all four dates 1 to 4. The total
number of observations is thus 734× 4 = 2936.
In 823 cases, the theory makes a unique prediction as to vote behaviour and
in 1722 cases any observation is compatible with the theory. Note that in 343
cases, it recommends not to vote for a given candidate.
14
Formally,
if v ∈ L: pi(v, v) = 1 and pi(c, v) = 1 for all c 6= v,
if v /∈ L: pi(c, v) = 1|L| if c ∈ L and pi(c, v) = 0 for all c /∈ L, where |L| is the number of
leading candidates.
15
Formally,
if v ∈ L: pi(v, v) = 1 and pi(c, v) = 1 for all c 6= v,
if v ∈ F : pi(c, v) = 1|L|+1 if c ∈ L ∪ {v} and pi(c, v) = 0 for all c /∈ L ∪ {v},
if v /∈ L ∪ F : pi(c, v) = 1|L| if c ∈ L and pi(c, v) = 0 for all c /∈ L.
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(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 212 269 157 638
Correct predictions
149
= 70%
211
= 78%
139
= 89%
499
= 78%
Table 17: Testing strategic noiseless theory, rational anticipations, 1R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 181 212 270 663
Correct predictions
125
= 69%
167
= 79%
235
= 87%
527
= 79%
Table 18: Testing strategic noiseless theory, myopic anticipations, 1R
Test We restrict attention to the last three elections of each series. This
theory makes unique predictions in 638 testable cases, of which 499 are correct,
that is 78%.
Comparison with the myopic version. The “Myopic” version of the
theory is very similar to the “Rational Anticipations” but the assumption 1
becomes :
Assumption 1bis (No noise, Myopic Anticipations) : Each individual
assumes that during the current election, all voters but herself will vote exactly
as they did in the previous election.
Comparing Tables 17 and 18 one can see that the qualitative conclusions to
be drawn from these two variants will be identical.
Strategic behaviour under the small-noise (ε > 0) assumption (1R)
Description with Rational Anticipation. Assumption 2 (Small noise,
Rational Anticipations) : Each individual belief is a small perturbation of
the actual votes of the other individuals at the current election.
More precisely, consider voter i. Her belief is a probability distribution over
the set of possible behaviour of the other voters. With probability ε (small),
one voter exactly (taken at random among the I − 1 remaing voters) makes a
mistake and does not vote for the intended candidate, but instead, with equal
probability votes for one of the other four candidates.
Note that the number of unique predictions is higher in the noisy case than
in the noiseless case. Indeed, we take ε extremely close to zero, so that each
time the strategic theory yields a unique prediction under the noiseless assump-
tion, the noisy theory yields the same unique prediction. To see why the noisy
assumptions yields unique predictions in many other cases, consider for exam-
ple voter i in the following situtation: in the current election, not taking into
account his own vote, she is sure that a candidate will be alone ahead leading
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1 2 3 4 5 total
1977 28 12 153 766 2936
67.3% 1.0% 0.4% 5.2% 26.1% 100%
Table 19: Multiple Predictions, ² > 0, 1R
by two votes (the rational noiseless assumption). With this noiseless assump-
tion, voter i is not pivotal, whoever she votes for, this leading candidate wins
with probability 1, and therefore voter i is indiﬀerent between voting for any
candidates. Now, with the noisy assumption, this voter also assigns a smlall but
positive probability to other events. If ε is small enough, the most likely event
is still by far the situation where this leading candidate is still two votes ahead.
But there is now a small probability that voter i might be pivotal. Indeed, for
example, if one of the voters who is supposed to vote for the leading candidate
rather votes for the second-ranked candidate, then these two candidates will
receive exactly the same number of votes, and in this event, voter i becomes
pivotal.
If a vote v is strictly better than another vote v0 for ε = 0, it will remain
so for ε > 0 provided that the probability ε is small enough. Consequently
the theory ε > 0 is a refinement of the theory ε = 0, just like trembling-hand
perfection is a refinement of Nash equilibrium.
Predictions. In that case, the probabilities pi(c, v) are harder to write
down in an explicit way. But they can easily be computed using Mathematica
software. Under these assumptions regarding the pi(c, v), we compute (using
Mathematica software) for each election (starting from the second election in
each session) and each individual, his expected utility when he votes for candi-
date v ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}: that is, Pc pi(c, v)ui(c). We then take the maximum
of these five values. If this maximum is reached for only one candidate, we say
that for this voter at that time, the theory makes a unique prediction regarding
how he should vote. If this maximum is reached for several candidates, the
theory only predicts a subset of candidates from which the voter should choose.
The table 19 gives the statistics regarding the number of candidates in this
subset. These figures are obtained considering all four dates 1 to 4. The total
number of observations is thus 734× 4 = 2936.
In 1977 cases, that is 67.3%, the theory makes a unique prediction as to vote
behaviour. This is much more than what we had with the no-noise assumption
(28.0%).
Test. We restrict attention to the last three elections of each series. This
theory makes unique predictions in 1358 testable cases, of which 984 are correct,
that is 72.5%.
Comparison with the myopic version. The “Myopic” version of the
theory is very similar to the “Rational Anticipations” but the assumption 2
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(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 583 512 263 1358
Correct predictions
374
= 64.2%
382
= 74.6%
228
= 86.7%
984
= 72.5%
Table 20: Testing strategic noisy theory, rational anticipations, 1R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 610 582 513 1705
Correct predictions
390
= 63.9%
431
= 74.1%
426
= 83.0%
1247
= 73.1%
Table 21: Testing strategic noisy theory, myopic anticipations, 1R
becomes :
Assumption 2bis (Small noise, Myopic Anticipations) : Each individual
belief is a small perturbation of the actual the vote of the other individuals at
the previous election. More precisely, we use exactly the same model for the
perturbation as before, but the reference scores are now the scores obtained at
the previous election not the current one.
Comparing Tables 20 and 21 one can see that the qualitative conclusions to
be drawn from these two variants will be identical.
7.2.3 “Top two” theory (1R)
Description. Individuals vote for their preferred candidate among the two
candidates that get the highest two numbers of votes in the current (“Rational
Anticipation” version) or the previous (“Myopic” version) election.
More precisely, consider individual i and denote by s−i(c) is the score (num-
ber of votes) that candidate c obtains in the reference election (the current or
the previous one), taking into account the ballots of all voters but i. Voter i can
rank candidates according to those scores. If two candidates at least rank in
the first place, then individual i votes for his preferred candidate among them.
If only one candidate rank first, the individual votes for his preferred candidate
among the set consituted of this first-ranked canked candidate and candidate(s)
getting the second highest score.
Predictions. This theory makes unique predictions in almost all cases, double
predictions may occur when a voter’s position is just between two candidates.
Test. This theory correctly predicts behaviour on approximately 70% of the
observations. Tables 22 and 23 show the time-evolution, and show again that
the two versions “rational anticipations” and “myopic anticipations” are similar.
29
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 695 695 693 2083
Correct predictions
422
= 60.7%
523
= 75.3%
555
= 80.1%
1500
= 72.0%
Table 22: Testing Top-Two theory, rational anticipations, 1R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 692 694 696 2082
Correct predictions
412
= 59.5%
494
= 71.2%
573
= 82.3%
1479
71.0= %
Table 23: Testing Top-Two theory, myopic anticipations, 1R
7.2.4 “Top three” theory (1R)
Description. Individuals vote for their preferred candidate among the three
candidates that got the highest three numbers of votes in the reference (current
or previous) election. More precisely,
- if three candidates at least ranked in the first place, the individual votes
for her preferred candidate among them,
- if two candidates exactly ranked in the first place, the individual votes
for his preferred candidate among the set consituted of those two first-ranked
canked candidate and candidate(s) getting the second highest score,
- if one candidate exactly ranked in the first place, and at least two candidates
ranked second, the individual votes for his preferred candidate among the set
consituted of this first-ranked canked candidate and candidate(s) getting the
second highest score,
- if one candidate exactly ranked in the first place and one candidate exactly
ranked, the individual votes for his preferred candidate among the set consituted
of this first-ranked candidate, this second-ranked candidate and candidate(s)
getting the third highest score.
Predictions. This theory makes unique predictions in almost all cases, double
predictions may occur when a voter’s position is just between two candidates.
Test. In 1R elections, this theory correctly predicts behaviour on about 70%
of the observations. Tables 24 and 25 show the time-evolution, and show again
that the two versions “rational anticipations” and “myopic anticipations” are
similar.
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(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 664 668 668 2000
Correct predictions
473
= 71.2%
464
= 69.5%
446
= 66.8%
1383
= 69.1%
Table 24: Testing Top-Three theory, rational anticipations, 1R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 667 663 669 1999
Correct predictions
491
= 73.6%
455
= 68.6%
453
= 67.7%
1399
70.0= %
Table 25: Testing Top-Three theory, myopic anticipations, 1R
7.3 Two Round elections
7.3.1 Sincere voting theory in 2R elections
Description. Exactly the same as for One-round elections. Individuals vote
for any candidate that yields the highest payoﬀ if elected. Individual i votes for
a candidate v∗ such that:
u(v∗) = max
v∈{A,B,C,D,E}
ui(v).
Predictions. Sincere Voting is independent of time. For all voters except
those in position 8 and 12, this theory makes a unique prediction. Voters in po-
sition 8 are indiﬀerent between B and C, and voters in position 12 are indiﬀerent
between D and C.
Test. See Table 15. At the first date, this theory correctly predicts behav-
iour for 74% of the observation. This percentage decreases to 55% for fourth
elections.
7.3.2 Strategic models in 2R elections
Note first that in two-round elections, in the second round with two run-oﬀ
candidates, voting for the candidate associated with the highest monetary payoﬀ
is a dominant strategy. Therefore, we only study strategic behaviour at the first
round.
As in the one-round elections, we assume that voters are purely instrumental
and that they select a candidate v∗ such that:
v∗ ∈ argmaxv∈{A,B,C,D,E}
X
c
pi(c, v)ui(c),
where pi(c, v) the subjective probability that voter i assigns to the event ”can-
didate c wins the election”, conditional on her casting a ballot for candidate v
at the first round.
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Note that these pi(c, v) involve both beliefs as to how voters will behave at
the second round (if any), and beliefs as to how voters will behave at the first
round. We can decompose this probability pi(c, v) into a sum of two probabili-
ties: the probability that c wins at the first round (that is getting an absolute
majority at the first round) plus the probability of the event ” c makes it to the
second round and wins the second round”. Formally, this can be decomposed
as:
pi(c, v) =
X
c0
πi({c, c0}, v)r(c, {c, c0}),
where for c0 6= c, πi({c, c0}, v) is the probability that the unordered pair {c, c0}
will make it to the second round, conditional on voter i voting for candidate
v and r(c, {c, c0} is voter i’s subjective probability that candidate c wins the
run-oﬀ election when the pair {c, c0} is vying at the second round16. To save on
notation, we define πi({c, c}, v) as the probability that c wins at the first round
if i votes for v and r(c, {c, c} = 1.
Let us first describe the r(c, {c, c0}) when c0 6= c. In all that follows, we
assume that each voter anticipates that at the second-round (if any), each voter
will vote for the candidate closest to her position, and will toss a coin if the two
run-oﬀ candidates are equally close to her position:
- the centrist candidate C defeats any other candidate in the second round:
r(C, {C, c}) = 1 for c 6= C,
- a moderate candidate (B or D) defeats any extremist candidate (A or E) in
the second round: r(B, {B, c}) = r(D, {D, c}) = 1 for c ∈ {A,E},
- a second round between either the two moderate candidates or the two ex-
tremist candidates results in a tie: r(B, {B,D}) = r(D, {B,D}) = r(A, {A,E}) =
r(E, {A,E}) = 1/2.
Let us give an exemple of the πi({c, c0}, v) and how we derive the pi(c, v).
Consider voter i who holds the following beliefs about the first round. She
thinks that candidate B will make it to the second round, although he has no
chance to gather an absolute majority. And she thinks that there will be an
extremely close race between candidates C and D for the second position, the
race beeing so close that she thinks she will b1/2e pivotal between these two
candidates. In that case, we might have πi({B,C}, C) = πi({B,D},D) = 1 and
πi({B,C}, v) = πi({B,D}, v) = for v 6= B,D. Given the beliefs concerning the
run-oﬀ election, we can easility compute the pi(c, v). We obtain the following
table:
c/v A B C D E
A 0 0 0 0 0
B 1/4 1/4 0 1/2 1/4
C 1/2 1/2 1 0 1/2
D 1/4 1/4 0 1/2 1/4
E 0 0 0 0 0
16There is no subcript i because all voters have the same beliefs regarding the secound
round. See below.
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In that case, deciding whom to vote for involves comparing ui(C) and
1/2ui(B) + 1/2ui(D). If ui(C) > 1/2ui(B) + 1/2ui(D), then this voter should
vote for C; if ui(C) < 1/2ui(B) + 1/2ui(D), then this voter should vote for D;
if ui(C) = 1/2ui(B)+1/2ui(D), then all votes yields the same expected utility.
In all that follows, we assume that to compute the πi({c, c0}, v), each voter
forms some beliefs about how other voters will behave in the current election,
based on the results of the reference (previous or current) election. Just as we
proceeded in 1R-elections, we assume that each voter simply thinks that other
voters will behave at the first-round in the current election either exactly as
they did at the first-round of the reference election, or approximately so.
We now describe more precisely how we compute the pi(c, v) probabilities
under these alternative assumptions, and test this theory.
Strategic behaviour under the no-noise (ε = 0) assumption (2R)
Description with Rational Anticipations Assumption 1 (No noise,
Rational Anticipations) : Each individual has a correct anticipation of the
vote of the other individuals at the current election.
In that case, the subjective probabilities pi(c, v) are more diﬃcult to write
down explicitly than they were in One-round elections. Given the scores s−i(c)
(number of votes) that candidate c obtains in the first round of the current
election, taking into account the ballots of all voters but i, with
P
c s−i(c) =
I − 1, what is the probability πi({c1, c2}, v) that the pair {c1, c2} will make it
to the second round, conditional on voter i voting for candidate v?
We introduce some further notation. Let us denote by si(c, v) is the score
(number of votes) that candidate c obtains in the reference election, if voter i
votes for candidate v and all other voters vote exactly as they do in the refernce
election. Let us denote by ski (v), k = 1, 2, ..., 5 the k-th largest number in the
vector (si(c, v), c ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}). For example, if si(A, v) = 3, si(B, v) = 5,
si(C, v) = 6, si(D, v) = 5, si(E, v) = 2, then s1i (v) = 6, s
2
i (v) = 5, s
3
i (v) = 5,
s4i (v) = 3, s
5
i (v) = 2.
Definition of the probability that candidate c1 wins in the first round,
πi({c1, c2}, v), c1 = c2,
- if si(c1, v) > E[I/2] then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1,
- in all other cases, πi({c1, c2}, v) = 0.
Definition of the πi({c1, c2}, v), c1 6= c2, s1i (v) < E[I/2]
- if si(c1, v) > s3i (v) and si(c2, v) > s
3
i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1
- if si(c1, v) = si(c2, v) = s1i (v) = s
3
i (v) > s
4
i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/3
- if si(c1, v) = si(c2, v) = s1i (v) = s
4
i (v) > s
5
i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/6
- if si(c1, v) = si(c2, v) = s1i (v) = s
5
i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/10
- if si(c1, v) = s1i (v) > si(c2, v) = s
2
i (v) = s
3
i (v) > s
4
i (v), or si(c2, v) = s
1
i (v) >
si(c1, v) = s
2
i (v) = s
3
i (v) > s
4
i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/2,
- if si(c1, v) = s1i (v) > si(c2, v) = s
2
i (v) = s
4
i (v) > s
5
i (v), or si(c2, v) = s
1
i (v) >
si(c1, v) = s
2
i (v) = s
4
i (v) > s
5
i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/3,
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1 2 3 4 5 total
194 2 4 160 2576 2936
6.6% 0.1% 0.1% 5.4% 87.7% 100%
Table 26: Multiple predictions, ² = 0, 2R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 31 47 37 115
Correct predictions
10
= 32.2%
34
= 72.3%
18
= 48.6%
62
= 53.9%
Table 27: Testing strategic noiseless theory, rational anticipations, 2R
- if si(c1, v) = s1i (v) > si(c2, v) = s
2
i (v) = s
5
i (v), or si(c2, v) = s
1
i (v) >
si(c1, v) = s
2
i (v) = s
5
i (v), then πi({c1, c2}, v) = 1/4,
- in all other cases, πi({c1, c2}, v) = 0.
Now for each pair, a voter can anticipate the outcome of the second round,
see above. And thus this fully describes the pi(c, v).
Predictions. Under these assumptions, we can compute the pi(c, v).We
compute (using Mathematica software) for each election and each individual,
her expected utility when he votes for candidate v ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}: that
is,
P
c pi(c, v)ui(c). We then take the maximum of these five values. If this
maximum is reached for only one candidate, we say that for this voter at that
time, the theory makes a unique prediction regarding how she should vote. If
this maximum is reached for several candidates, the theory only predicts a subset
of candidates from which the voter should choose.
The table 26 provides statistics regarding the number of candidates in this
subset. These figures are obtained considering all dates 1 to 4. The total number
of observations is thus 734× 4 = 2936.
One can see that this theory is of little use since it only make a sharp
prediction for 6.6% of the observations.
Test. For the sake of completeness, Tables 27 and 27 provide the tests of
this theory in the two version (Rational and Myopic anticipations) for the last
three dates.
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 77 31 48 156
Correct predictions
47
= 61.0%
12
= 38.7%
31
= 64.6%
90
= 57.7%
Table 28: Testing strategic noiseless theory, myopic anticipations, 2R
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1 2 3 4 5 total
576 60 36 196 2068 2936
19.6% 2.0% 1.2% 6.7% 70.4% 100%
Table 29: Multiple predictions, ² > 0, 2R
(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 127 123 125 375
Correct predictions
68
= 53.5%
75
= 61.0%
79
= 63.2%
222
= 59.2%
Table 30: Testing strategic noisy theory, rational anticipations, 2R
Strategic behaviour under the small-noise (ε > 0) assumption (2R)
Description with Rational Anticipation. Assumption 2 (Small noise,
Rational Anticipations) : Each individual belief is a small perturbation of the
actual vote of the other individuals at the current election. The perturbations
are introduced in the model exactly as for One-Round elections (see above).
Predictions. The Table 29 provides statistics regarding the number of
multiple predictions. These figures are obtained considering all four dates 1 to
4. The total number of observations is thus 734× 4 = 2936.
In 576 cases, that is 19.6%, the theory makes a unique prediction as to vote
behaviour. This is much more than what we had with the no-noise assumption
(194, that is 6.6%).
Test. See Table 30. We restrict attention to the last three elections of each
series. This theory makes unique predictions in 375 testable cases, of which 222
are correct, that is 59.2%, and this figure is increasing with time.
Comparison withe the “Myopic” version. Assumption 2 becomes :
Assumption 2bis (Small noise, Myopic Anticipations) : Each individual
belief is a small perturbation of the actual the vote of the other individuals at
the previous election. More precisely, we use exactly the same model for the
perturbation as before, but the reference scores are now the scores obtained at
the previous election not the current one.
Comparing Tables 30 and 31 one can see that the qualitative conclusions to
be drawn from these two variants will be identical.
7.3.3 “Top-Two” theory (2R)
Description. Same theory as for One-round elections. Individuals vote for
their preferred candidate among the two candidates that obtain the highest two
numbers of votes in the reference election. The reference election is the current
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(1R) t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
Testable predictions 199 126 124 449
Correct predictions
106
= 53.3%
66
= 52.4%
72
= 58.1%
244
= 54.3%
Table 31: Testing strategic noisy theory, myopic anticipations, 2R
predictions t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
unique 691 694 695 2080
unique and valid 386 424 466 1276
% 55.9% 61.1% 67.1% 61.1%
Table 32: Testing the Top-Two theory, rational anticipations, 2R
one (in the “rational anticipations” version) or the first round of the previous
one (in the “myopic anticipations” version).
Predictions. This theory makes unique predictions in almost all cases, double
predictions may occur when a voter’s position is just between two candidates.
Test. This theory correctly predicts behaviour on approximately 60% of the
observations. Tables 32 and 33 show the time-evolution: the percentage of
correct predictions increases. One can verify again again that the two versions
“rational anticipations” and “myopic anticipations” are similar.
7.3.4 “Top-Three” theory (2R)
Description. Same theory as for One-round elections. Individuals vote for
their preferred candidate among the three candidates that got the highest two
numbers of votes in the reference election.
Predictions. This theory makes unique predictions in almost all cases, double
predictions may occur when a voter’s position is just between two candidates.
Test. This theory correctly predicts behaviour on approximately 73% of the
observations. Tables 34 and 35 show the time-evolution: the percentage of
correct predictions increases. One can verify again again that the two versions
“rational anticipations” and “myopic anticipations” are similar.
predictions t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
unique 685 690 695 2070
unique and valid 370 438 447 1255
% 54.0% 63.5% 64.3% 60.6%
Table 33: Testing the Top-Two theory, myopic anticipations, 2R
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predictions t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
unique 663 661 663 1987
unique and valid 468 476 501 1445
% 70.6% 72.0% 75.6% 72.7%
Table 34: Testing the Top-Three theory, rational anticipations, 2R
predictions t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 total
unique 664 663 661 1988
unique and valid 467 483 494 1444
% 70.3% 72.9% 74.7% 72.6%
Table 35: Testing the Top-Three theory, myopic anticipations, 2R
7.4 Other theories for One-round and Two-round voting
We have also tried other theories:
- A mixed theory of sincere voting and instrumental voting. Individuals may
have both expresssive and instrumental motives when they cast their ballot. A
possible form is the following: Individual i votes for a candidate v∗ such that:
v∗ ∈ argmaxv∈{A,B,C,D,E}
Ã
λui(v) + (1− λ)
X
c
pi(c, v)ui(c).
!
.
- Some smoother versions of the Top-Two and Top-Three theories. For example,
for the Top-Two theory, we considered a smoother version where voters do no
only consider candidates who were ranked higher than second in the previous but
attributed a positive probability that all candidates were ”serious” candidates,
this probability increasing with the scotre of the candidates.
So far, these variations have not been more helpfull than the theories we
report on here.
7.5 Approval voting
The strategic behaviour in that case is derived from the theory in Laslier (2008),
slightly adapted to take care of ties. If there are no ties the behaviour is easily
described: the voter has in mind a reference election (the current election or the
previous one). She compares the leading candidate to the second-ranked one,
and she approves all candidates she prefers to the leader, and no candidate she
finds worse than the leader.
Here is a complete description of this theory. Like in the case of 1R or 2R
elections, s−i(c) is the total number of votes obtained by candidate c in the
reference election, from voters other than i herself. Denote by
C1i = argmax s−i
the set of candidates who tie at the first place in the score vector s−i and by
#C1i their number. If i decides to approve of no candidate and the other voters
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vote like in the reference election then the winner of the election will be chosen
at random in C1i . Likewise, denote by C
2
i the set of second-ranked candidates
in s−i.
First case If a single candidate, say c1, has the highest score in the vector s−i
then i considers the utility she attaches to this candidate
u(1) = ui(c
1).
For the other candidates c 6= c1, if ui(c) > u(1), i approves c, and if
ui(c) < u
(1), i disapproves of c. For candidate c = c1 himself, as well
as for any other candidate c such that ui(c) = u(1), i compares with the
second-ranked candidates: let
u(2) =
1
#C2i
X
c∈C2
i
ui(c),
if u(1) > u(2), i approves c1, if u(1) < u(2), i disapproves c1, and if c is such
that ui(c) = u(2), i can either approve c∗ or not (no unique prediction).
Second case If two or more candidates have the same highest score in the vec-
tor s−i then i considers the average utility she attaches to these candidates
u(1) =
1
#C1i
X
c∈C1
i
ui(c).
Then if ui(c) > u(1), i approves c, if ui(c) < u(1), i disapproves of c, and
if c is such that ui(c) = u(1), i can either approve c or not (no unique
prediction).
With this definition one makes one or several prediction for each vote of a
voter about a candidate. An individual ballot is made of the five votes for the
five candidates.
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